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On Lawyers and Good Samaritans: A Reflection 
Mark A. Chinen1 
 
1.  
One summer during law school, I worked as a summer associate for a 
firm in Hawaii that engaged in insurance defense work.  One of the lawyers 
asked for help in preparing a motion in a case the firm was handling.  
According to the file, a  high school boy took the family SUV for a drive.  
A classmate, a fifteen-year-old girl, went along for the ride.  As the boy 
turned off the highway and drove along a sugar cane road that ran parallel 
to the main road, the SUV hit a bump and flipped over.  The girl was 
thrown from the vehicle and landed headfirst on the highway.  She did not 
survive.  Her  parents sued the boy’s parents for negligent supervision.  We 
represented the defendants. 
Amid the accident reports and pleadings was a copy of a letter from the 
boy’s mother to the girl’s mother.  As best as I can remember, the mother 
began, “I am writing to you against the advice of my lawyer, but I feel I 
must do something to give you a sense of how very sorry and how 
devastated we are by all that has happened.”  The boy’s mother shared how 
her son had not been the same since the accident.  He had become 
withdrawn.  His grades had slipped.  He wrestled with drug dependency.  
The mother closed the letter by writing, “I am not trying to affect the course 
of this case, but I felt that things just couldn’t go on this way.  I felt I must 
do something to make a connection with you.” 
It was hard not to be moved by that letter and to reflect on its deeper 
meaning.  For years, the lessons I drew from it were how limited the law is 
in solving basic human problems and how sometimes law (in this case, as 
manifested in the adversary process) actually interferes with the resolution 
of those problems.  Our client needed a good legal defense, but she also 
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needed far more; she needed reconciliation, forgiveness, and the healing of 
the soul, both for herself and for her family.  These were obviously things 
that the law and its machinery could never provide.  Moreover, under our 
prisoner’s dilemma-like calculus, 2  what she really wanted potentially 
conflicted with our goals as her representatives.  
That the law is limited and that it sometimes interferes with the 
fulfillment of legitimate human needs are important lessons to be sure.  But 
more recently, I have come to see that the mother’s letter teaches yet 
another, perhaps even more important lesson about being helpers and the 
helped, experts and novices, about being ourselves.  It is a lesson that 
shows itself in a story from Luke, to which I now turn, and runs through the 
law, our classrooms, and beyond. 
 
2. 
One day, an expert in Jewish law came to Jesus and asked, “Teacher, 
what must I do to receive eternal life?”3  In what amounts to a Socratic 
exchange, Jesus replied, “What is written in the law?  How do you read it?”  
The lawyer4 answered with a quote from the Torah, “Love the Lord your 
God with all of your heart, soul and strength, and your neighbor as 
yourself.”5  Jesus said, “You have answered correctly; do this and live.”  
The exchange could have ended there.  But the lawyer wanted to justify 
himself.  Perhaps now that he had been assured that he had correctly 
identified the right commands, he wanted to make sure that he was obeying 
them.  Perhaps he was dissatisfied with Jesus’ answer or with his encounter 
with Jesus.  Perhaps he wanted to see if there were any qualifications to the 
command.  In any event, the lawyer asked a follow-up question: “And who 
is my neighbor?” 
Jesus responded by telling the story of the Good Samaritan.  Most of us 
are familiar with it.  A man who was traveling from Jerusalem to Jericho 
was attacked by thieves.  They stripped and beat him, took his belongings, 
and left him to die in the road.  By chance a priest came along, saw the man 
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in the road, and moving to the side, walked on.  A Levite came up, saw the 
man, and passed by on the other side.  But then a Samaritan happened by 
and, realizing what had happened, felt compassion for the man.  The 
Samaritan bound the man’s wounds, pouring oil and wine on them, and put 
him on his own donkey.  The Samaritan took him to an inn.  He gave the 
innkeeper two denarii (altogether about two days wages for a laborer) and 
said, “Take care of him, and if you spend more, I will pay you when I come 
this way again.”  
Then Jesus asked the lawyer, “Which of the three in your judgment 
proved neighbor to the man who fell among thieves?”  The lawyer 
answered, “The one who showed mercy to him.”  Jesus said to him, “Go, 
and you do likewise.” 
 
3. 
Like many passages of scripture, it is impossible to draw out the full 
implications of the story or to give it a definitive interpretation.  Much has 
been made, for example, of the Samaritan’s act of altruism; perhaps this 
behavior is so admirable because it appears to so rarely happen.  This is 
probably the aspect of the story that has had the broadest impact on our 
culture, including the law.  For example, the Samaritan is memorialized in 
laws that bear his name; to some extent they shield persons who render aid 
to others from tort liability.  Yet we conclude with some regret that the law 
does not and cannot force people to act like the Samaritan.  Justice Parker 
had the Good Samaritan in mind when he held unenforceable Seth 
Wyman’s promise to pay Daniel Mills for expenses Daniel had already 
incurred in caring for Seth’s dying son, Levi.6   With barely concealed 
contempt for the father, Parker wrote, “General rules of law established for 
the protection and security of honest and fair-minded men, . . . will 
sometimes screen men of a different character from engagements which 
they are bound in foro conscientioe to perform.”7 
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The Good Samaritan story is also a study in contrasts and surprises.  Both 
the priest and the Levite were part of the social and religious elite of their 
day.8  The Samaritan, by contrast, was a pariah.9  Samaritans were not 
mentioned in polite company.  (Note that the lawyer does not refer to the 
Samaritan directly but uses a circumlocution instead: “the one who showed 
mercy.”10)  Yet, even though the Samaritan was an outsider, it was he who 
had compassion for the man in the road and went out of his way to help 
while the priest and Levite walked on.  But whether the Samaritan is 
viewed alone, or in contrast to others, the chief application of the story is to 
be like the Samaritan. 
Similarly, for Günther Bornkamm the message of the story is: Be a 
neighbor.  Bornkamm argues that the lawyer asks the question, “Who is my 
neighbor?” to put distance between himself and the command to love his 
neighbor as himself.  For the lawyer and those in his society, his 
relationships and duties to others were defined by concentric circles: “our 
nearest neighbour, our neighbour, our not so near neighbour, until we come 
to those towards whom we have no further obligation, indeed whom we 
have a right or even an obligation to hate.”11  Bornkamm argues that Jesus 
used the Samaritan story to break through or collapse those circles.  First, 
Jesus forces the listener to identify with the man lying in the road.  For a 
dying man, questions about circles, about who is in and who is out, become 
irrelevant.  The hearers of the time would expect those in the inner circle to 
come to the rescue, yet they do not.  They would never expect a Samaritan 
to show compassion to a man who probably despises him, yet he does.  
Then, as discussed earlier, immediately after introducing this surprise 
character, Jesus flips the lawyer’s question and asks him to identify the 
neighbor in the story.  According to Bornkamm, Jesus does this to force the 
listener to place him or herself and the neighbor in such close proximity that 
it becomes useless to ask the question of who is neighbor.  “The question: 
Who is my neighbour? has been changed into another: To whom am I a 
neighbour?”12  “Thus,” writes Bornkamm, “the questioner, in being asked 
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to make his neighbour’s position his own, finds himself directed to himself, 
and learns what it means to love one’s neighbour as oneself.” 13   For 
Bornkamm then, Jesus uses the Samaritan not so much to identify one’s 
neighbors as to demonstrate in an almost visceral way what it means to love 
one’s neighbor as oneself.  It means to just do it, without hesitation, no 
questions asked.   
In my view, Bornkamm’s interpretation comes very close to the heart of 
the matter.14  Yet I want to focus on something Bornkamm alludes to but 
treats only briefly as he moves to his main point.  The message of the story 
might indeed be, “Be a neighbor,” but the story also has something to say 
about who we are before we become neighbors, who we are as the 
concentric circles are collapsing.  Jesus answers the lawyer’s question, 
“And who is my neighbor?” with a story and a counter-question, “Which 
one proved neighbor to the man in the road?”  In his response to that 
second question, the lawyer names not only his neighbor; he also names 
himself.  He is the dying man in the road, in need of help and in need of a 
neighbor. 
As the story collapses the distance between individuals along the 
horizontal axis, at the same time, it collapses the distance between 
individuals along the vertical axis.  Too often, the helper can be miscast in 
relation to the one helped.  The helper is the powerful one, the 
knowledgeable one, and sometimes the rich one.  In contrast, the one 
helped is miscast as weak, ignorant, and often poor.  Within that structure, 
love of one’s neighbor is unilateral and directed downwards.  The readers 
of Luke’s gospel, primarily non-Jewish people,15 would have been familiar 
with an extreme form of this phenomena: the helper would be a patron, 
doling out as it were, love.  Under those circumstances, love of one’s 
neighbor would have the subtle effect of reinforcing the existing order: 
loving someone would be best expressed in the giving of alms, to be 
received by the lower strata with gratitude that in turn justifies the patron’s 
status.16 
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Jesus, however, draws from a tradition in Judaism that has an entirely 
different view of relative positions and of right relationships within a 
society.17  Given Jesus’ understanding of the nature of God, where God 
holds sway, all such things are turned on their heads.  The story of the 
Samaritan teaches in part, “You may think you are in a position to love your 
neighbor, but you do not know how precarious your situation is.  Truth be 
told, you need your neighbor far more than your neighbor needs you.”18 
 
4. 
 The lawyer in the Samaritan story is not the only person capable of 
condescension, the result of which can be forms of injustice.  Audrey 
Vokes brought an action seeking to rescind on grounds of misrepresentation 
a series of contracts she had entered into with a local dance studio affiliated 
with Arthur Murray, Inc.19  Her complaint alleged that the studio had duped 
her into signing up for tens of thousands of dollars worth of dance lessons 
by flattering her with false statements of her dancing ability.  The 
instructors told her that she was very promising as a dancer and improving 
quickly with her lessons; in turn, she continued to pay for more instruction.  
The case is primarily known for the court’s holding that although mere 
statements of opinion are generally not sufficient to constitute 
misrepresentations, under the facts as alleged in the complaint, 20  what 
would be taken as just an opinion when people are dealing on equal terms 
can be taken as a statement of fact when one of the parties has superior 
knowledge.21  If the allegations were true, it could be concluded that the 
defendant’s dance instructors had superior knowledge of Ms. Vokes’s 
potential as a dancer and her progress, and the court reasoned it could be 
inferred that the flattery that preceded each additional contract was 
motivated more by monetary gain than by an appraisal of her true potential 
as a dancer or her progress.22 
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There are arguments pro and con as to the substance of the decision.  For 
purposes of this reflection, however, what is interesting is how the court 
views Ms. Vokes.  This is how the court begins its recitation of the facts: 
Plaintiff Mrs. Audrey E. Vokes, a widow of fifty-one years and 
without family, had a yen to be ‘an accomplished dancer’ with the 
hopes of finding ‘new interest in life.’  So . . . a dubious fate, with 
the assist of a motivated acquaintance, procured her to attend a 
‘dance party’ at Davenport’s ‘School of Dancing’ where she 
whiled away the pleasant hours, sometimes in a private room, 
absorbing his accomplished sales technique, during which her 
grace and poise were elaborated upon and her rosy future as ‘an 
excellent dancer’ was painted for her in vivid and glowing colors.  
As an incident to this interlude, he sold her eight half-hour dance 
lessons to be utilized within one calendar month therefrom, for the 
sum of $14.50 cash in hand paid, obviously a baited ‘come on’.23 
One wonders how Ms. Vokes must have felt when she read that 
paragraph.  The court reinstates her suit, thereby giving her a chance to 
receive some measure of justice, but the cost of that justice is her dignity.  
The court portrays the plaintiff as a lonely woman who has, for all intents 
and purposes, been seduced.  She is widowed, alone, and in search of 
something more in her life.  Along comes an elegant stranger who sweeps 
her off her feet, in a private room no less, and who gives her hope for the 
future, but it is all a “come on.”  For purposes of this litigation, this is Ms. 
Vokes’s identity, memorialized for all to read.24  The court’s condescension 
perpetuates the image of the victim as weak and in need of help and keeps 
her there. 
But the Samaritan story turns the tables and makes the lawyers and 
judges the victim.  It is, to say the least, disconcerting to be asked to 
identify oneself with the victim of a violent assault, left to die on a road.  
Simone Weil writes:  
To acknowledge the reality of affliction means saying to oneself: ‘I 
may lose at any moment, through the play of circumstances over 
which I have no control, anything whatsoever that I possess, 
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including those things which are so intimately mine that I consider 
them as being myself.  There is nothing that I might not lose.25   
 It is not by chance that violence is inserted into the Samaritan story.  The 
man is the victim of a brutal, physical attack.  Violence is particularly 
effective in demonstrating how vulnerable a person can be.  
Two people see the man and walk on.  We see how quickly a person can 
be transformed into a victim, from an insider into an outsider, out of fear,26 
ignorance, or malice.  Such transformations put everyone in peril: the 
tragedies and injustices that befall outsiders are well known, but there is a 
cost to insiders too.  In his novel Hawaii, James Michener relates a rather 
poignant scene in which a missionary woman lies dying in childbirth.27  
Two missionaries fumble through the pages of a book on midwifery while 
native Hawaiian midwives wait outside with expertise and medicines that 
could save both the mother and the newborn.  The missionaries refuse to 
ask for help because it would not be right for a Christian baby to be born 
with the assistance of the people they have come to convert, so the mother 
dies.  They could not bring themselves to ask for help from someone 
“outside” or “below” them; perhaps it was beyond their intellectual or 
psychological power to do so.  It would have meant radically revising their 
beliefs about themselves, their mission, and the people they had come to 
“serve.”  But regardless of their reasons for inaction, the result was deadly. 
 
5. 
The good news, however, is that the man is not left lying in the road.  He 
is helped, and Jesus says, “Go and you do likewise.”  But now as the lawyer 
goes his way, hopefully it is with a better understanding of who he is in 
relation to those he helps and who helps him.  The story of the Samaritan 
asks lawyers to pose the question: Is it possible that the litigant in our 
courtroom, the client in our office, or the student in our lecture hall is our 
rescuer?  How could that possibly be?  There is of course the rather obvious 
fact that we in the legal profession make our livings from this work.  We 
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would not be here but for those who use the legal system or find themselves 
caught up in it.  But there is more to it.  There is a way in which every 
person who appears before us and asks for help or for justice invites us to 
participate in that help and justice as well. 
I am a teacher now and write this reflection at the beginning of the 
academic year.  Already, there are students in my first year class who are 
asking questions about the rightness of the result of a particular case, or the 
ethical implications of a particular legal rule.  We are already beginning the 
dialogue that will lead to Justice Parker’s conclusion in Mills v. Wyman, 
that sometimes law is unable to achieve justice and creates injustices when 
it attempts to do so.  But my students remind me that it is possible to 
become too comfortable with that conclusion, and that there is something in 
the human experience that cannot be captured in the doctrines, concepts and 
activities that make up contemporary legal thought and practice. 
But the story of the mother and the letter that began this reflection 
highlights this possibility even better.  I never learned what happened to 
her.  I trust that she and her family found some measure of peace.  Now I 
realize that in her letter, she was telling those of us who legally represented 
her that she was more than a defendant, more than a client to be guided 
through the legal labyrinth.  She was a person, who was extending to us a 
silent offer of help, a reminder, and an invitation.  She, like the Samaritan, 
was asking us to recall that in the end there are no concentric circles, no 
insiders or outsiders, no top or bottom.  There are only people who move in 
full circle, from people who need their neighbors, to neighbors, and back 
again.  She was inviting us to join that circle.  She was inviting us to 
community. 
 
                                                          
1   M.Div., Yale Divinity School, J.D., Harvard Law School.  Associate Professor, Seattle 
University School of Law.  My thanks to James Eblen, Serene Jones, Daniel Morrissey, 
Dean Summers, and Ruby Takushi for comments on earlier drafts of this reflection. 
2 The prisoner’s dilemma is a situation out of game theory in which it is irrational for 
the players to cooperate. 
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3 The text is found at Luke 10:25-37. 
4 The Greek word, nomikos, is often translated “lawyer” and as it appears in Luke, 
refers to Jewish experts or teachers of the law.  Hans Hübner, νοµιχός in 2 EXEGETICAL 
DICTIONARY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 470-71 (Horst Balz & Gerhard Schneider eds., 
1981); νοµιχός, A GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON OF THE NEW TESTAMENT AND OTHER 
EARLY CHRISTIAN LITERATURE 541 (William F. Arnt & F. Wilbur Gingrich trans., 2d 
ed. 1979). 
5 The lawyer is quoting from Deuteronomy 6:4-5 and Leviticus 19:18. 
6 Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825).  According to the court, Levi, 25, was 
seriously ill after having returned from sea.  The court states, Daniel “acted the part of the 
Good Samaritan, giving him shelter and comfort until he died.”  Id. at 209.  Daniel 
informed Levi’s father, Seth, of his son’s illness and what he had done for him.  Seth 
replied and promised that he would reimburse Daniel for the expenses he had incurred on 
Levi’s behalf.  Later, Seth refused to pay.  At issue was whether the promise was 
enforceable under contract law.  The court found that it was not.  Since the promise had 
been made with respect to services that had already been provided, the promise was not 
supported by consideration.  Id. at 211. 
7 Id. at 208-09. The court appears to have had its facts wrong.  See Geoffrey R. Watson, 
In the Tribunal of Conscience: Mills v. Wyman Reconsidered, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1749, 
1756, 1761 (1997) (presenting evidence that Levi was very much alive and that Seth had 
actually promised to pay for future services, which would have rendered the promise 
enforceable). 
8 Alexander Sand, ίερεύς in 2 EXEGETICAL DICTIONARY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT, 
supra note 4 at 174-75; Gerhard Schneider, Λευίτης in id. at 350.  As N.T. Wright 
explains, priests and Levites were considered to be at the very center of the prevailing 
religion of that day, which placed great emphasis on ritual purity.  N.T. WRIGHT, JESUS 
AND THE VICTORY OF GOD 307 (1996).  Wright suggests that the priest and Levite might 
have passed by to keep themselves ritually pure.  Id.  See also MARCUS J. BORG, 
MEETING JESUS AGAIN FOR THE FIRST TIME 54-55 (1994). 
9 Samaritans were considered a separate ethnic and religious group and thus by 
definition outside of the society.  For more information, see Gijs Bouwman, Σαµαρεια in 
2 EXEGETICAL DICTIONARY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT, supra note 4, at 226-27 and the 
bibliography listed at 226. 
10 Bouwman points this out. Id. 
11 GÜNTHER BORNKAMM, JESUS OF NAZARETH 112 (Irene McLuskey et. al. trans., 
1960) (emphasis added). 
12 Id. at 113. 
13 Id. 
14 Although, to say that the lawyer’s self is being directed to himself has the flavor of an 
existential overlay on the text.  Other scholars draw different, though not inconsistent, 
lessons from the parable.  For Wright, Jesus uses the Good Samaritan story to show that 
the walls between insiders and outsiders have been broken down.  WRIGHT, supra note 8 
at 306-307.  For Borg, the story is a critique of the then prevailing purity system in which 
one was acceptable to God through keeping ritually pure.  BORG, supra note 8 at 54-55. 
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15 See WERNER GEORG KÜMMEL, INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW TESTAMENT 149-50 
(Howard Clark Kee trans., 1975) (arguing that the author of Luke was almost certainly a 
Gentile Christian); WILLI MARXSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW TESTAMENT: AN 
APPROACH TO ITS PROBLEMS 161 (G. Buswell trans., 1968) (concluding that Luke was 
writing to a Greek audience). 
16 For a discussion of the patronage system in Roman society, see JOHN DOMINIC 
CROSSAN, THE HISTORICAL JESUS: THE LIFE OF A MEDITERRANEAN JEWISH PEASANT 
43-71 (1991). 
17 For a discussion of this tradition, see JOHN DOMINIC CROSSAN, THE BIRTH OF 
CHRISTIANITY: DISCOVERING WHAT HAPPENED IN THE YEARS IMMEDIATELY AFTER 
THE EXECUTION OF JESUS 182-208 (1998). 
18 This message would be consistent with other passages in Luke.  Luke uses other 
passages to portray the religious elite as failing to comprehend the reign of God while it 
is almost intuitively grasped by those purportedly on the margins of the society.  See, 
e.g., Luke 7:36-50, 14:7-14, 16:19-31, 18:9-14. 
 Economic hierarchies are also on Luke’s mind.  For example, in Luke’s version of the 
Sermon on the Mount (in Luke, the Sermon on the Plain), Jesus says, “Blessed are those 
that hunger, for they shall be filled.”  Luke 6:21.  Later he follows with a series of ‘woes’, 
one of them being, “Mourn, those of you who are filled now, for you shall be hungry.”  
Luke 6:25.  Contrast this with Matthew’s telling of the Sermon.  According to Matthew, 
Jesus says, “Blessed are those that hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be 
filled.”  Matthew 5:6.  The corresponding list of ‘woes’ is absent in the Matthean version.  
See also Luke 1:46-55 (the Magnificat). 
 For a discussion of how the parables can be understood as a critique of the then-
existing social structures, see generally WERNER R. HERZOG II, PARABLES AS 
SUBVERSIVE SPEECH (1994). 
 Finally, under Wright’s argument that the story is a critique of artificial boundaries 
between insiders and outsiders, supra note 14, the Samaritan teaches that the person you 
have rejected as an outsider is the one you need most. 
19 Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 1968). 
20 The appeal challenged the lower court’s dismissal of the case with prejudice for 
failure to state a claim.  Id. at 909. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 907. 
24 The court continues to poke fun at Ms. Vokes in its description of the allegations in 
the complaint.  Ms. Vokes signed up for a large series of lessons through fourteen 
different contracts.  Id.  The misrepresentation claim was that “All the foregoing sales 
promotions. . . .were procured by . . .  false representations to her that she was improving 
in her dancing ability, that she had excellent potential, that she was responding to 
instructions in dancing grace, and that they were developing her into a beautiful dancer, 
whereas in truth and in fact she did not develop in her dancing ability, she had no ‘dance 
aptitude’, and in fact had difficulty in ‘hearing the musical beat’.” Id.   
 The complaint alleged that such representations to her ‘were in fact false and known 
by the defendant to be false and contrary to the plaintiff’s true ability, the truth of 
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plaintiff’s ability being fully known to the defendants, but withheld from the plaintiff for 
the sole and specific intent to deceive and defraud the plaintiff and to induce her in the 
purchasing of additional hours of dance lessons’. It was averred that the lessons were 
sold to her ‘in total disregard to the true physical, rhythm, and mental ability of the 
plaintiff’.  Id.  In other words, while she first exulted that she was entering the ‘spring of 
her life’, she finally was awakened to the fact there was ‘spring’ neither in her life nor in 
her feet. Id. at 908.  (emphasis added).  The court must have known its Tennessee 
Williams.  
25 Simone Weil, On Human Personality, reprinted in THE SIMONE WEIL READER 313, 
332 (George A. Panichas ed., 1977).  Weil gets a bit extreme.  She continues, “It could 
happen at any moment that what I am might be abolished and replaced by anything 
whatsoever of the filthiest and most contemptible sort.” Id. 
 I might be accused of misquoting Weil because for her, the affliction she describes 
serves as a portal through which one enters into truth.  Affliction reduces the individual 
to a state of non-being that for Weil is almost a precondition for openness to that which 
transcends the individual, namely, truth and beauty.  See id. at 332-33.  Weil is not the 
only one who has alluded to the transformative power of affliction.  In WAR AND PEACE, 
Pierre Bezuhov undergoes such a transformation when he is captured by Napoleon’s 
army and dragged along as it retreats during the Russian winter.  See generally LEO 
TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE (Modern Library, 1931). 
 It is tempting to overlay the themes of redemptive suffering on the Samaritan story.  
As I discuss in the main text, the violent imagery does serve a purpose, but it would 
probably distort the  story to read into it a call for the annihilation of the self. 
26 Weil would probably explain that no one really wants to be confronted with this bare 
truth. She writes “To put oneself in the place of someone whose soul is corroded by 
affliction, or in near danger of it, is to annihilate oneself.”  Weil, supra note 25, at 332. 
27 JAMES A. MICHENER, HAWAII 270-71 (Fawcett Crest 1959). 
